The Georgian Deadlock Behind the Copenhagen Resolution: A Democracy Struggle in Geopolitical Gaming
- Times Tengri
- Oct 10
- 5 min read

The text of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's resolution and the Georgian government's actual actions have transformed the streets of Tbilisi into a battleground for Western and Russian influence.
On October 2, 2025, in Copenhagen, Denmark, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution entitled "Upholding Democracy and the Rule of Law in Georgia" by a vote of 68 in favor, 7 against, and 2 abstentions. The document accused the Georgian authorities of "systematically ignoring" its concerns about the democratic crisis, stating that "the rapid decline in democracy has continued to such an extent that the very existence of Georgia's democratic system is now called into question."
That same day, at the European Community summit in the same city, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze emphasized that Georgia is at the heart of the "Middle Corridor"—the shortest and most stable route connecting European and Asian markets. This contradictory scenario epitomizes Georgia's delicate balancing act between the West and Russia.
01 The Resolution and Georgia's Political Deadlock
The PACE resolution demonstrates a complete lack of confidence in the Georgian authorities. Submitted by PACE Monitoring Co-Rapporteurs Edith Estrella and Sabina Chudic, the draft resolution explicitly states that Georgia's "rapid democratic regression" threatens the very existence of the democratic system.
The resolution specifically focuses on the upcoming local elections, expressing regret over the decision by most opposition parties not to participate. PACE accuses the Georgian authorities of failing to invite the Council of Europe's Assembly of Local and Regional Authorities to observe the elections and of deliberately delaying the OSCE/ODIHR invitation to observe to the point of making it impossible.
This resolution is not an isolated incident. On February 13, 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Georgia with 400 votes in favor, 63 against, and 81 abstentions, rejecting the legitimacy of the ruling Georgian Dream party and parliamentary government. The European Parliament considers Georgia's fifth president, Salome Zurabishvili, to be the country's "sole legitimate representative," despite the fact that her constitutional powers expire at the end of December 2024.
The Georgian government's response was equally forceful. Prime Minister Kobakhidze scoffed at PACE's threats, stating that Georgia had previously suspended its participation in PACE activities on its own initiative. He accused the European bureaucracy of "utter absurdity" and the corresponding European politicians of "absurdity."
02 Historical Background and Georgia's Geopolitical Choices
The shift in Georgia's relations with the West did not occur overnight. In November 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by 444 votes rejecting the legitimacy of Georgia's October 26 parliamentary elections. In response, Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced: "We have decided not to put the issue of opening negotiations with the EU on the agenda before the end of 2028. Furthermore, we refuse any budgetary allocations from the EU until the end of 2028."
Kobakhidze accused European politicians and bureaucrats of "using allocated grants and loans to blackmail Georgia," stressing that "extortion with money is an insulting practice that no self-respecting Georgian would ever accept."
However, this stance contradicts the general sentiment among Georgians. A poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the United States shows that 86% of Georgians support EU membership to varying degrees. In late November 2024, when thousands of Georgians spontaneously rallied to protest the government's policy of "distancing itself from the EU and fully aligning itself with Russia," Georgian President Zurabishvili and major opposition groups joined the protests.
The Georgian Dream party's pro-Russian leanings maintain a delicate balance with its foreign policy, which refuses to fully embrace Russia. Despite the government's suspension of negotiations with the EU, Kobakhidze maintains that Georgia's foreign policy priority is EU integration. This seemingly contradictory stance reflects Georgia's strategy for surviving in a geopolitical limbo.
03 Geoeconomic Factors and the Importance of the Middle Corridor
Georgia's geographical location gives it unique geoeconomic value. At the European Community summit, Prime Minister Kobakhidze emphasized that Georgia aims to "further develop the Middle Corridor by improving its efficiency, thereby strengthening its role as a reliable and competitive East-West transport route."
The importance of the Middle Corridor became particularly evident in September 2025, when the temporary closure of the Polish-Belarusian border disrupted most land transport from China to Europe. Georgia, a key participant in this corridor, is implementing significant investments, including the construction of the deep-water port of Anaklia, "the most modern port on the Black Sea."
However, the PACE resolution was passed on the eve of Georgia's local elections, coinciding with the pro-Western opposition's attempt to overthrow the authorities through a so-called "peaceful revolution." This timing raises questions about the EU's true intentions: are they promoting democracy or destabilizing this strategic economic route?
After meeting with Georgian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán called Georgia "Europe's most successful country" and stated that "Brussels is by no means a center of fairness and impartiality." This statement reflects divisions within the EU on the Georgian issue, with not all European countries supporting a tough stance against the Georgian government.
04 The Russian Factor and the Paradox of Western Strategy
Russia's presence is pervasive in Georgian politics. Following a meeting of member state foreign ministers in Brussels, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaya Kallas expressed Brussels' concern that "Georgia is coming under Russian influence."
The PACE resolution may have the opposite effect, creating opportunities for Russia. Some analysts believe that the EU's continued offensive against Georgia reflects the West's perceived defeat following the opposition's defeat in the parliamentary elections. This view suggests that the EU's aggressive stance actually benefits Russia, further pushing Georgia eastward.
Russian observer Stanislav Tarasov noted, "Following the emergence of anti-Russian tendencies in Armenia and the complication of relations between Moscow and Baku, it is safe to assume that external forces will attempt to destabilize the situation in Georgia in order to forge a unified, pro-Western geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus."
Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze explicitly stated that the main reason for the deterioration of Georgia-EU relations since 2022 is "Georgia's refusal to engage in military confrontation with Moscow." He emphasized, "The primary guarantee of peace in a country is its independence and sovereignty." This statement reflects Georgia's difficult struggle to maintain a balance between the two major powers.
05 Conflict between Democratic Values and Geopolitical Realities
The EU's stance on Georgia reflects the tension between democratic values and geopolitical realities. On the one hand, the PACE resolution strongly criticized Georgia's Foreign Influence Transparency Law, deeming it "incompatible with European standards." The resolution also criticized the Grants Law, adopted on April 16, 2025, stating that these laws are "devastating to Georgian civil society, whose very existence is currently at risk." On the other hand, the Georgian government accused the EU of double standards. Kobakhidze called on Brussels to "transform anger into mercy," noting that "the EU itself needs to overcome 'democratic backsliding.'" He cited worrying trends in the EU's democracy, human rights, and economy, expressing hope that these trends will be reversed at some point in the future upon EU accession.
This conflict between values and practical interests has also created divisions within the EU. Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán has explicitly stated that attacks on the Georgian government, including those perpetrated by PACE, "do not represent the interests of Europe as a whole." The divisions within the EU reflect a strategic dilemma over how to manage relations with Georgia.
The sight of European and Georgian flags hanging side by side remains common on the streets of Tbilisi. However, underlying these divisions are deepening rifts. Some policymakers in Brussels appear to believe that pressure can force political change in Georgia. However, the meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze revealed clear divisions within the EU on this issue.
Geoeconomic realities may ultimately prove decisive. As the Middle Corridor grows in importance, neither the EU nor Georgia can afford a complete breakdown in relations. Georgia needs European markets and investment, and Europe needs Georgia's transport corridors. This interdependence may provide a basis for both sides to find a new balance.







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