The EU-Armenia strategic agenda has triggered a strong reaction from Azerbaijan.

An Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry statement pointed out that the EU-Armenia partnership strategic agenda "distorts the reality of the post-conflict era" and "runs counter to the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process."

On December 2, 2025, the sixth meeting of the EU-Armenia Partnership Council was held in Brussels, where the two sides signed the "EU-Armenia Partnership Strategic Agenda," setting strategic priorities for cooperation over the next seven years. However, this document immediately drew strong protests from Azerbaijan upon its release.

On December 9, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry issued a formal statement accusing the document of "distorting the reality of the post-conflict era" and "running counter to the overall peace agenda between Azerbaijan and Armenia."

At the heart of this diplomatic crisis is Azerbaijan's view that the EU-Armenia strategic agenda incorporates bilateral issues into a multilateral framework, posing a threat to the regional peace process. This event reveals the reshaping of the great power rivalry in the Caucasus region.

01. The Document Touches a Nerve

Azerbaijan's protest primarily targets several specific clauses in the strategic agenda. The document refers to Karabakh Armenians as "refugees" and mentions "Karabakh Armenians displaced after Azerbaijan's military operations."

Azerbaijan counters that these residents "voluntarily migrated from Azerbaijan to Armenia after rejecting Azerbaijan's proposed reintegration program," opposing their classification as refugees.

The strategic agenda also includes support for "all relevant rulings of the International Court of Justice," which Azerbaijan argues clearly favors Armenian claims while ignoring its own legitimate lawsuits against Armenia. Azerbaijan emphasizes that the peace agreement already contains provisions that these claims will be eliminated.

Another point of contention is the document's designation of certain Armenians as "prisoners of war" and its prioritization of their release. Azerbaijan claims these individuals are "accused and convicted of crimes against humanity and military crimes."

What particularly angered Azerbaijan was the complete omission of the "Trump Road to International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPPP) project in the document. This project, a key arrangement in the normalization process agreed upon during the Washington summit on August 8, 2025, raises questions about Armenia's sincerity in fulfilling its commitments.

02 Armenia's Westward Strategic Shift

The strengthening of relations between the EU and Armenia was not sudden. On March 26, 2025, the Armenian parliament passed a bill formally initiating the process of joining the EU. This move marks a significant shift in Armenia's foreign policy.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated in Berlin that the visit was "historic," and that Armenia looked forward to continued political support from Germany on the "long and difficult road to the EU." Germany, in turn, pledged to deepen relations between Armenia and the EU and provide assistance on energy projects, helping Armenia achieve "a higher degree of independence in the energy sector."

The EU's investment plans in Armenia have already begun. It is understood that the EU's investment in Armenia is expected to reach €2.5 billion to promote inclusive growth and connectivity. These investments include the construction of roads and railways, upgrading the power grid, and investment in agriculture and digital infrastructure.

Armenia's westward strategy stems from both economic considerations and security needs. Armenia's setbacks in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Russia's failure to provide full support, prompted Armenia to reassess its traditional alliances.

03 EU's Caucasus Strategic Considerations

The EU's active courting of Armenia is driven by multiple strategic considerations. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU seeks to weaken Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space, and the Caucasus region has traditionally been Russia's sphere of influence.

Energy security is another important consideration for the EU. The EU plans to increase its gas imports from Azerbaijan through the "Southern Gas Corridor," aiming to reach 20 billion cubic meters per year by 2027, equivalent to 12% of the EU's gas import needs.

The EU is also attempting to expand its influence in the geopolitical landscape by investing in regional connectivity projects. For example, the EU plans to fund the "Digital Silk Road" project, connecting Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey, to promote the construction of a cross-border fiber optic network.

However, the EU's Caucasus strategy faces internal contradictions. On the one hand, the EU attempts to maintain a balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia; on the other hand, its closer strategic partnership with Armenia has provoked strong resentment from Azerbaijan.

04 The Caucasus Chessboard of Great Power Rivalry

The Caucasus region is becoming a focal point of great power rivalry. The United States, through brokering a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, successfully incorporated the TRIPP corridor project into its regional development blueprint, securing exclusive development rights for 99 years.

Russia, as a traditional dominant power, has expressed strong dissatisfaction with Armenia's westward shift. Kremlin spokesman Peskov warned, "Armenia wants to eat the EU's food, so don't eat ours!" Russia has also taken practical countermeasures, seizing Armenian copper exports on the grounds of "failing quality inspection."

Turkey, meanwhile, is actively expanding its regional influence by leveraging its close relationship with Azerbaijan. Turkey's military support for Azerbaijan has played a crucial role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Iran is also closely monitoring the situation in the Caucasus. The development of the TRIPP corridor will alter the regional balance of power and may compress Iran's policy space.

The power struggle among various parties in the Caucasus region has further complicated the reconciliation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian government is betting everything on the West, but this move faces multiple challenges both domestically and internationally.

05 Challenges and Prospects of the Peace Process

Despite external pressures, the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia still faces numerous challenges. The deep-seated contradictions of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are far from being resolved, and the prospects for regional peace remain uncertain.

Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution to explicitly relinquish its territorial claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. This issue has sparked considerable controversy within Armenia, with strong opposition from nationalist factions.

Armenia will hold parliamentary elections in June 2026, and a new constitution is expected to be drafted before the vote. This political schedule further exacerbates the uncertainty of the peace process.

The actual construction and operation of the TRIPP corridor also face numerous uncertainties. While the agreement explicitly states the formation of an international consortium, it remains unclear which specific US companies will lead the construction, and the extent of Armenia and Azerbaijan's participation.

The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed a "cautious welcome" to the peace agreement, but emphasized that reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia must be considered within the broader regional context. Russia pointed out that the previous Russia-Azerbaijan-Armenia TRIPPartite agreement remains valid, granting Russia the right to deploy border troops along the relevant routes.

The Caucasus region is at a crossroads. On one hand, regional countries seek greater strategic autonomy, attempting to maximize their interests in the great power game through balanced diplomacy; on the other hand, the increasingly deep involvement of external forces is further complicating the regional landscape.

The strategic agenda dispute between the EU and Armenia reflects the difficulty of rebuilding order in the Caucasus region in the post-conflict era. The future depends on whether all parties can find a balance of interests based on respect for regional realities. With the 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections approaching and the gradual unfolding of the TRIPP corridor construction, the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus region will continue to evolve.