The Dispute Behind Erdoğan and Aliyev

For the first time since 2012, Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, was absent from the 13th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States. His decision to skip the meeting held in Ankara on 30 October has exposed unusual and deepening strains in bilateral ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. The two countries have long maintained close political, military and strategic bonds. Official sources attributed his absence to a busy work schedule. Instead of travelling to Ankara, Aliyev attended the closing ceremony of the FIFA U-15 World Cup in Baku, while Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov led the Azerbaijani delegation to the summit. Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding this decision point to far deeper diplomatic and political disagreements.

The immediate trigger of the dispute emerged in September, when Azerbaijan revised its regulations governing school appearance. Citing incompatibility with the country’s secular public education system, the new rules effectively banned the wearing of hijabs in state schools. On 12 October, Oktay Saral, chief adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, criticised the policy in a post on X. He described the exclusion of hijab-wearing students from education as unacceptable and called on Baku to reverse the measure immediately. This post remains publicly available.

Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party issued a sharp response within one day. It accused Saral and several lawmakers from Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party of interfering in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. Its warning against hegemonic tendencies within the Islamic world made it clear that the disagreement extended beyond the issue of religious freedom in schools. Baku has grown increasingly wary of Ankara’s readiness to comment on Azerbaijan’s domestic political and social arrangements.

The conflict escalated further between 18 and 21 October. Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office obtained international arrest warrants in absentia for seven Turkish citizens over protests staged outside Azerbaijani diplomatic missions. Later reports put the figure at eight, including Ridvan Kaya, chairman of Özgür-Der, and commentator Fatih Tezcan. The discrepancy between the number of people named in the warrants and subsequent press reports is noteworthy, as available accounts have not reached a consistent figure.

On 21 October, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs added 31 Turkish nationals to its list of persona non grata. The list included Fatih Erbakan, leader of the New Welfare Party, journalist Adem Özköse and Member of Parliament Ömer Gergerlioğlu. Baku stated that these individuals had made remarks hostile to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and leadership. These measures pushed the confrontation from verbal criticism into the realm of diplomatic and legal pressure.

A phone call between Erdoğan and Aliyev on the evening of 21 October briefly raised expectations of a settlement. Both presidential offices released readouts of the conversation. Türkiye’s Directorate of Communications published its version on X, while Azerbaijan released its statement on the official presidential website. Both texts covered bilateral relations and regional developments. Erdoğan personally invited Aliyev to attend the upcoming OTS summit in Ankara. Neither statement, however, confirmed that Aliyev had accepted the invitation.

It is vital to distinguish between maintaining diplomatic communication and agreeing to attend the summit. Azerbaijan’s pro-government news agency APA published an analysis on the same day, noting that the conversation carried major political implications, yet its coverage did not suggest Aliyev would take part. The cordial tone of the presidential statements offered little evidence that the underlying disputes had been resolved.

The next major development unfolded within Erdoğan’s administration. Between 25 and 26 October, Erdoğan dismissed Saral from his post as chief adviser. Reporting by Middle East Eye framed the dismissal as a precondition set by Azerbaijan for improving bilateral relations. The publication wrote that Baku demanded Saral’s removal and the prosecution of Turkish commentators who had insulted Aliyev. An Azerbaijani source quoted in the report said Saral’s departure would raise the likelihood of Aliyev attending the summit, and that the probability of his participation had stood below fifty percent before the dismissal.

Saral later confirmed his removal to journalist Talat Attila. He said Erdoğan had instructed him to leave the post. When asked whether his comments on Azerbaijan had caused the dismissal, he replied briefly: “Yes, it seems so.” This episode demonstrated Ankara’s willingness to make a political concession to stop further deterioration of bilateral relations.

This concession failed to secure Aliyev’s attendance. On 29 October, Azerbaijan’s Report news agency cited official sources to announce that the president would not travel to Ankara due to a busy schedule, with his attendance at the FIFA U-15 World Cup closing ceremony in Baku cited as the competing engagement. Bayramov’s presence guaranteed formal representation for Azerbaijan, but the president’s absence carried distinct political weight. It marked the first time Aliyev had skipped an OTS summit since 2012.

The Reasons behind Aliyev’s Absence

Three sets of explanations have emerged from available reporting, centred on diplomatic reciprocity, sovereignty disputes, and Azerbaijan’s drive to sustain political links beyond Erdoğan’s government. These explanations are closely interwoven and far more persuasive than the official line of scheduling conflicts.

Diplomatic Reciprocity and the CICA Precedent

The most straightforward explanation comes from Aliyev’s aides, who reportedly told Turkish journalist Deniz Zeyrek that the president’s absence was a reciprocal response to Erdoğan’s decision to skip the CICA summit held in Baku on 15 October. Türkiye was represented by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan rather than its president. Bayramov leading Azerbaijan’s delegation in Ankara followed exactly the same pattern.

APA’s analysis titled Why Did President Ilham Aliyev Not Travel to Türkiye? reinforced this interpretation. The article described Erdoğan’s telephone invitation as a belated gesture and stressed that reciprocity is a fundamental principle of diplomacy. It also recalled Erdoğan’s absence from the informal OTS summit in Shusha in 2024, when he chose to attend a football match in Berlin instead.

Azerbaijan’s demands went further than merely removing Saral. According to reports, Baku expected action against all seven Turkish citizens facing arrest proceedings, rather than measures limited to the two individuals who had been questioned. Demands to shut down social media accounts deemed hostile to Azerbaijan also remained unresolved. These requirements have not appeared in any public formal list, yet media coverage indicates that Saral’s dismissal alone was insufficient to meet Baku’s broader expectations.

The sequence of events is also meaningful. Erdoğan’s absence from the CICA summit preceded the telephone invitation, Saral’s dismissal and Aliyev’s final decision to stay away from Ankara. Baku’s emphasis on reciprocity shows that the summit boycott was intended to signal dissatisfaction with Ankara’s conduct, rather than merely express disagreement over Saral’s remarks.

The Hijab Controversy and the Broader Sovereignty Dispute

The school regulations row served as the immediate trigger, but the core disagreement concerns the limits of Turkish influence over Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy. Azerbaijani state-aligned media laid out this deeper grievance with unusual clarity.

An editorial published by Minval on 29 October argued that the central fault line lay in Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel. Widely understood to reflect official thinking in Baku, the article noted a wave of accusations and humiliation directed at Azerbaijan by Turkish media and social platforms over its ties with Israel, and added that official Ankara had intervened too late.

The conclusion of the editorial was particularly revealing. It argued that any Turkic union must be built on mutual respect and recognition of each member’s independence. This argument rejects the assumption that Türkiye can exercise political authority over Azerbaijan simply because of their close historical, linguistic and strategic ties.

Reuters also reported that the tensions stemmed from disagreements over Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, its partnership with Israel and Türkiye’s approach to normalising relations with Armenia. These issues carry wide regional implications. Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy, while Ankara’s regional calculations follow a separate set of diplomatic and security priorities. Shared Turkic identity does not automatically produce identical positions on these matters.

This distinction is key to understanding the boundaries of the bilateral partnership. Türkiye and Azerbaijan maintain extensive political, economic and military cooperation. Their close relationship does not eliminate divergences over foreign policy or the interpretation of national sovereignty. The October confrontation brought these differences fully into public view.

Political Outreach beyond Erdoğan’s Government

The third dimension is Azerbaijan’s engagement with Turkish political forces outside the ruling Justice and Development Party. Even as relations with Erdoğan’s administration deteriorated, Baku kept in touch with Turkish opposition and nationalist figures.

On 25 October, the New Azerbaijan Party hosted Türkiye’s Victory Party at its headquarters in Baku. Two days earlier, on 23 October, Rashad Aslanov, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Türkiye, met Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, in Ankara. Both meetings took place shortly before the OTS summit and Aliyev’s decision to remain in Baku. These contacts show that Azerbaijan is keen to preserve political channels across Türkiye’s domestic political spectrum.

Additional reports suggest a widening diplomatic distance. Open Azerbaijan and exiled journalist Ganimat Zahid circulated claims that Parliament Speaker Sahiba Gafarova had instructed New Azerbaijan Party lawmakers to avoid events hosted by the Turkish Embassy. Other reports alleged that pro-government Azerbaijani MPs boycotted the Republic Day reception at the Gulustan Palace. These accounts remain unconfirmed, and no official public document proves such instructions were issued.

Even so, these reported contacts and alleged boycotts form part of a broader pattern worthy of examination. Azerbaijan seeks to maintain political communication within Türkiye independently of its ties with Erdoğan’s government. This strategy gives Baku alternative channels during periods of friction with Ankara and signals that Azerbaijan’s political engagement with Türkiye will not be tied exclusively to the incumbent administration.