Reviving the South Caucasus 3+3 Format: Russia’s Regional Agenda and the New Game of Caucasus Geopolitics

On November 3, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly called for the prompt resumption of the 3+3 consultation platform for the South Caucasus. This framework brings together the three South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia alongside three regional powers Russia, Turkey and Iran. The forum stalled after the foreign ministers’ meeting in Tehran in 2023, and most subsequent talks have proceeded in a truncated 3+2 format with Georgia consistently absent. Against a backdrop of deepening fragmentation across the South Caucasus and growing engagement by outside powers, Russia’s push to restart the dialogue is far more than a routine diplomatic gesture. It represents a strategic bid to shape regional leadership, security norms and transit corridors.

The 3+3 concept emerged in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Its original vision was to create a framework led by regional actors, free from unilateral external intervention, covering conflict mediation, border demarcation, cross-border transit, energy routes and coordinated regional economic ties. Russia, Turkey and Iran all hold long-standing security and economic interests in the South Caucasus. Russia views the region as its southern security buffer and an extension of the post-Soviet space. Turkey leverages its close ties with Azerbaijan to advance corridors linking the Caucasus to Central Asia. Iran prioritises stability along its northern frontier and overland connectivity with Armenia, while remaining alert to how new transit routes may reshape its geopolitical position. While the three share a common wariness of unilateral outside stewardship of regional affairs, their competing priorities over corridor alignments and influence distribution created inherent tensions from the outset.

The strategic landscape of the South Caucasus has shifted markedly since the format was conceived. Border skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia have largely ceased, and joint delimitation commissions carry out technical demarcation work. A draft peace agreement has been finalised, yet formal signing remains held up by disputes over constitutional revisions and residual claims. Meanwhile, Armenia continues its diplomatic diversification and deepens cooperation with the European Union and Western partners, steadily loosening its traditional security reliance on Russia. Georgia sustains its European integration orientation and remains guarded toward the 3+3 platform. Tbilisi fears participation would force it to accept regional rules forged jointly by Russia, Turkey and Iran and narrow its diplomatic room for manoeuvre toward the West. This concern underpins Georgia’s long-standing refusal to join.

It is amid such fragmentation that Russia has chosen to issue this fresh call for revival. Moscow’s core objectives are clear. First, to restore a durable multilateral channel so that peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia do not shift entirely to negotiating tracks led by the European Union and the United States, preserving Russia’s seat as a mediator in the reconciliation process. Second, to use the platform to coordinate security and transit issues, including the Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor, and prevent the governance of these critical arteries from being defined solely by Azerbaijan, Turkey and their Western partners. Third, to maintain tacit coordination among Russia, Turkey and Iran on regional issues amid intensifying great-power competition, sustaining a venue for regional states to deliberate and counter institutional inroads by Western actors in the South Caucasus.

Still, formidable practical barriers stand in the way of revival. The primary obstacle is Georgia’s stance. As long as Georgia stays away, the 3+3 format remains incomplete and lacks the authority to serve as a comprehensive framework covering the whole South Caucasus. Tbilisi’s security agenda is structurally at odds with those of Russia, Turkey and Iran, and it will not easily alter its cautious posture merely in response to Russian overtures. Second, Russia and Turkey hold competing interests. Turkey, backed by Azerbaijan, actively promotes the Middle Corridor as a gateway to Central Asia to expand its footprint across Turkic-speaking nations, a goal that clashes with Russia’s desire to retain its traditional centrality in regional logistics. Iran meanwhile fears certain corridor configurations would sever its land link with Armenia, and these security anxieties persist. The three states share limited common ground, and many discussions are likely to remain declaratory rather than produce binding commitments.

Choices made by the three smaller South Caucasus nations will also determine the format’s trajectory. Azerbaijan pursues balanced diplomacy. It welcomes multiple diplomatic channels, relying heavily on Turkey while avoiding full estrangement from Russia, and holds an open attitude toward 3+3. Armenia faces the most delicate position. It could use the forum to mitigate security pressures, yet it is wary of becoming institutionally constrained in ways that undermine its westward diplomatic pivot. All three states seek to maximise their autonomy by navigating between major powers and will not align unconditionally with any single great-power blueprint.

External actors cannot be discounted. The European Union has deployed a civilian mission in Armenia, maintains an active role in Azerbaijani-Armenian peace talks, and keeps applying European integration-related leverage on Georgia. Western capitals are sceptical of the closed, regional-power-led consultation model embodied by 3+3, seeing it as a threat to their own influence in the South Caucasus. If the forum regains momentum, Western states will likely ramp up their own mediation and economic instruments, creating parallel regional agendas and raising the risk of bloc polarisation across the Caucasus.

In the longer term, the greatest realistic value of a regularised 3+3 process may not lie in delivering sweeping accords rapidly. It can serve as a risk-mitigation mechanism, reducing miscommunication and preventing isolated incidents from escalating into renewed conflict on technical, less sensitive files such as border demarcation, transit customs rules, energy pipeline safety and emergency communication. That said, it cannot unilaterally impose a new regional order. The South Caucasus is no longer a geopolitical sphere where Russia commands uncontested primacy. Regional power dispersion and enduring multi-sided competition are the new normal.

Lavrov’s statement signals a proactive Russian push to reclaim agenda-setting authority before the South Caucasus order solidifies. Whether the 3+3 format can resume fully functional meetings hinges not on Russian rhetoric alone. It depends on whether Russia, Turkey and Iran can set aside rivalries to craft proposals that respect the security concerns of smaller states, and whether Georgia is prepared to soften its wariness. Multiple negotiating tracks will run in parallel across the South Caucasus in the period ahead. A return of the 3+3 platform is not the end of conflict, but the starting point of a fresh round of geopolitical contestation. This nodal region connecting the Caspian Sea, Black Sea and West Asia will continue its slow search for equilibrium amid competing pulls of influence.