Kazakhstan Denies Suspending Russian Oil Transit

"No, to my knowledge, the transit of Russian oil is conducted within the framework of an intergovernmental agreement. I see no reason to question this intergovernmental agreement. The agreement is functioning normally." On December 16, 2025, in an interview with RIA Novosti, Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Daurian Abayev, explicitly denied reports of a possible suspension of Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan.

This statement was made in response to recent speculation in some media outlets. Previous reports suggested that Western sanctions pressure could jeopardize oil supplies. Abayev emphasized that transit transport is still proceeding in full and is being carried out based on existing intergovernmental agreements.

Following the Ukrainian drone attack that damaged the Caspian Pipeline Union terminal, Kazakhstan is actively seeking to diversify its transport routes, including transshipping some crude oil to China. This decision highlights the real challenges faced by landlocked countries in maintaining energy export security within a complex geopolitical landscape.

01 Rumors and Official Response

The source of this controversy can be traced back to a report by RTVI media. The report cited sources as saying that Kazakhstan was considering suspending the transit of Russian oil. The reason given was the potential risks posed by sanctions and the need for clarification from the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Ambassador Abayev's response was direct and clear, denying the possibility of suspending transit. In an interview, he emphasized: "The transit of Russian oil is conducted in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement. I have not seen any indication that this intergovernmental agreement will be questioned. The agreement is being implemented."

The swift official response from Kazakhstan was not an isolated incident. Simultaneously with the ambassador's statement, the Kazakh Ministry of Energy announced that following the Ukrainian drone attack on the Caspian Pipeline Union's terminal facilities, the country would divert some crude oil from the large Kashagan oil field to China.

02 Energy Lifeline and Transit Economy

The transit of Russian oil through Kazakhstan is of significant strategic importance to both sides. Since 2014, Russian crude oil has been transported to China via pipelines through Kazakhstan, with Kazakhstan charging a transit fee of $15 per ton of oil.

This figure has increased significantly over time. The annual volume of Russian crude oil transported to China via Kazakhstan has climbed from an initial 7 million tons to approximately 10 million tons by 2024. Based on this calculation, Kazakhstan earns $150 million annually from this alone, not including value-added tax.

For Kazakhstan, this revenue stream is virtually risk-free. The pipeline is already built, maintenance costs are relatively low, and Russian oil flows continuously across the Central Asian steppes; Kazakhstan simply sits by collecting the toll.

The fate of this energy corridor was sealed 20 years ago. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan signed an oil development agreement. After CNPC won the Aktobe oil field project, the two countries quickly finalized the pipeline construction plan in 2003. The 962-kilometer Atasu-Alashankou section of the pipeline was completed in just one year and officially put into operation in December 2005.

03 Geopolitical Challenges

Kazakhstan's energy transportation faces real challenges. In late November 2025, the Caspian Pipeline Union oil terminal near Novorossiysk, Russia, was attacked by a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel, causing severe damage to this energy hub.

This attack severely damaged the terminal's No. 2 mooring device, paralyzing the loading infrastructure and forcing the suspension of oil exports. The Caspian Pipeline Union carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports, transporting over 1% of global supply.

Following the incident, the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong protest with Ukraine regarding the attack on critical infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Union. The Ministry stated, "We believe this action damages bilateral relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine."

This is the third deliberate attack on this civilian facility. The Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasized that the normal operation of the facility is guaranteed by relevant principles of international law.

The attacks on energy infrastructure pose a serious threat to Kazakhstan's economy. Experts estimate that the incident could lead to a decline in both Kazakhstan's oil production and exports. From January 1 to November 21, 2025, the total amount of oil transported via the Caspian Pipeline increased by 13% year-on-year, reaching 65.5 million tons.

04 The Balancing Act of Multi-Vector Diplomacy

Against this complex backdrop, the Kazakh ambassador's denial of rumors regarding Russian oil transit reflects the essence of the country's multi-vector diplomacy: maintaining a balance in great power competition and safeguarding its own national interests.

Kazakhstan is unwilling to lose any of the benefits offered by Russia, and "putting all its eggs in one basket" is at the core of its multi-vector diplomacy. However, the current international situation is pushing Kazakhstan to a crossroads where it must make choices.

The stable revenue from transit fees provides this largest Central Asian country with room to adjust its diplomatic compass. Kazakhstan maintains traditional ties with Russia while discussing counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States, acting as both a "transit point" for Russian energy and extending an olive branch to the West.

During the January 2022 unrest, Tokayev used the Russian military to quell the turmoil, but subsequently purged former President Nazarbayev's supporters. Economic independence fostered political autonomy. When Russia suspended the Caspian oil pipeline in July of the same year, citing a leak, Kazakhstan immediately withdrew from the CIS Monetary Council in retaliation.

05 Future Prospects of the Energy Corridor

Kazakhstan's role as an energy bridge between China and Russia is increasingly prominent. In May 2025, Putin decided to increase crude oil exports to China via Kazakhstan by another 2.5 million tons, bringing the total to 12.5 million tons, extending the contract to 2034.

More importantly, Russia has for the first time opened up oil and gas equipment technology to Kazakhstan—a previously tightly controlled "bottleneck" area is now being proactively loosened. This is both an "energy security guarantee" to China and a signal to the United States: don't try to drive a wedge between China and Russia.

Kazakhstan has been officially positioned as an "energy bridge between China and Russia," with each party gaining what it needs: China gains oil resources, Russia circumvents sanctions, and Kazakhstan expands its financial resources.

In July 2025, the Kazakh Ministry of Energy released the "Oil Refining Industry Strategy 2025-2040," planning to dump refined oil products into China and India. Three modern refineries stand in the desert, with a daily capacity of 350,000 barrels, not only consuming domestic crude oil but also targeting emerging markets in the East.

Kazakhstan's ambitions extend beyond energy transit. In 2025, Kazakhstan discovered a super-large rare earth deposit in Karaganda Oblast, with resources exceeding 20 million tons. This discovery has a potential value of tens of billions of dollars, potentially placing Kazakhstan among the top three in the world in rare earth reserves [citation:6].

However, as a landlocked country, Kazakhstan's mineral exports rely almost entirely on transportation through neighboring countries. This reality makes cooperation with China in the energy transportation sector particularly important for Kazakhstan.

Between the Black Sea's waves and the Caspian Sea's surge, Kazakhstan firmly holds the reins of energy transport. While other transit countries waver in the East-West rivalry, Astana's policymakers understand that energy transit agreements are not only a source of revenue but also a bargaining chip in geopolitics.

With the gavel falling in January 2025, extending the Russian oil transit agreement to 2033 and locking in a rate of $15 per ton, the next decade of this energy corridor has a clear plan.