From Going Its Own Way to Moving Forward Together: Central Asian States Gather at the Tashkent Summit

On November 17, 2025, the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries gathered in Tashkent for the Seventh Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State. On the eve of the summit, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev published an article entitled "Central Asia at the Threshold of a New Era," pointing out that regional connectivity has laid a "solid foundation" and emphasizing that this summit marks "an important milestone in building a stable and interconnected Central Asia." This statement reflects the phased achievements of cooperation in the Central Asian region, but its deeper significance must also be examined within its historical context and global landscape.

I. From Confrontation to Dialogue: A Historic Turning Point in Regional Cooperation

The progress of cooperation among Central Asian countries was unimaginable a decade ago. During the tenure of Uzbekistan's first president, Islam Karimov, regional relations were fraught with tension. He had made harsh remarks about leaders of neighboring countries such as Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, even accusing Tajikistan of "condoning criminals" and planting landmines along its border in connection with the 1999 Tashkent bombing. At that time, "good neighborly relations were out of the question," bilateral visits were rare, let alone multilateral cooperation.

The turning point came in 2016 with Mirziyoyev's "neighborhood first" policy. The first regional leaders' meeting in 2018 was a breakthrough, with even Turkmenistan, which had traditionally avoided regional interaction, sending a delegation at the speaker level. Subsequently, the consultative conference mechanism gradually became regularized: the 2019 Tashkent Summit conferred the title of Honorary Chairman upon Nazarbayev (although his influence waned following the January bloodshed); the 2020 Avaza Summit commemorated the 30th anniversary of the region's independence; the 2023 Dushanbe Summit welcomed the President of Azerbaijan as an honorary guest; and the 2024 Astana Summit adopted the "Central Asia-2040" regional cooperation and development vision. This process demonstrates that Central Asia is shifting from "passively responding to crises" to "actively building institutional frameworks."

II. Pragmatic Cooperation: Border, Energy, and Cultural Connectivity

The substantive achievements of the summits are reflected in breakthroughs in specific areas:

1. Resolution of Border Issues: Following the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2023, the two sides signed a border agreement in March 2025, declaring "no longer disputed areas." Mirziyoyev stated that the borders between Central Asian countries are now "legally confirmed along their entirety." 2. Facilitating Cross-Border Travel: Since September 2023, citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been able to travel freely with just their identity cards. Similar policies are being discussed with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Mirziyoyev pointed out that this move is "an important step towards building a free movement of people zone."

3. Breakthrough in Energy Cooperation: While Karimov opposed the construction of cross-border hydropower stations, the Mirziyoyev government agreed in 2023 to jointly construct the Kambalata 1 Hydropower Station with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan holding 33%, 34%, and 33% equity respectively). The project will be transferred to Kyrgyzstan upon completion and has received support from the EU's "Global Gateway" strategy.

These developments demonstrate that regional countries are translating political consensus into concrete cooperation projects, but challenges remain. For example, the 2023 Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness and Cooperation for Central Asian Development in the 21st Century was only signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; Tajikistan will not join until 2025, and Turkmenistan has not yet signed, reflecting the complexity of coordinating national interests.

III. Central Asia in a Global Perspective: Multi-Vector Balancing and External Games

In his article, Mirziyoyev emphasizes that Central Asia has become an "independent participant" in international politics, mentioning multiple "5+" dialogue mechanisms with the EU, the US, China, and Russia. 2025 will see a surge in regional diplomatic activity: the Samarkand-EU summit in April, the Astana "Central Asia-China" summit in June, the Dushanbe "Central Asia-Russia" talks in October, and the Washington-US presidential meeting in November. This multilateral interaction reflects both Central Asia's geostrategic value and tests its ability to maintain balance.

Alisher Ilkhamov, founder of the Central Asia Due Diligence Centre, a British think tank, points out: "The countries in this region are attracting global interest as a group of nations rather than individuals. This means that if they want to maintain and enhance their international standing, they should continue to advance internal integration efforts within Central Asia." This view reveals the external driving force behind Central Asian cooperation—collective identity helps strengthen bargaining power in international negotiations.

However, internal integration still lags behind external connections. Intra-regional trade volume was only $10 billion, far lower than the $94 billion with China and $28 billion with Russia. Mirziyoyev's proposed $20 billion intra-regional trade target requires overcoming structural bottlenecks such as lagging infrastructure and tariff barriers.

IV. Future Challenges: Limitations and Opportunities of Regional Integration

Despite the summit's display of unity, deep-seated obstacles cannot be ignored:

- Development gap: Kazakhstan's economy accounts for 65% of the region's total, and this asymmetry in power may affect the equality of cooperation;

- External competition: China, Russia, the US, and the EU all exert influence through investment and security cooperation; Central Asia must avoid becoming an arena for great power rivalry;

- Institutional weaknesses: Consultative meetings lack binding force, and resolutions rely on individual countries' independent implementation. For example, the "Central Asia-2040" vision still needs a concrete roadmap.

Mirziyoyev's goal of "achieving substantial unity" requires more institutional innovation. For example, establishing a joint development fund by drawing on the EU's "structural fund" model, or establishing a joint cross-border crisis response mechanism. Furthermore, the fact that the Azerbaijani president has been invited to the summit for three consecutive years suggests that Central Asia is exploring a "Caucasus-Central Asia" linkage to expand its geoeconomic space.

Conclusion

The Tashkent Summit marks a new stage in Central Asian regionalism: moving from symbolic meetings to pragmatic cooperation, and from managing bilateral conflicts to building multilateral institutions. However, the "threshold of the new era" mentioned by Mirziyoyev still faces internal and external challenges—internally, it needs to address the lagging economic and trade integration; externally, it needs to maintain a strategic balance among major powers. If Central Asia can translate the political will of this summit into sustainable action, it may truly achieve a historic leap from "going its own way" to "working together."