European Commission Report: Georgia Further Deviates from EU Course

The European Commission's Enlargement Assessment Report, released on November 4, 2025, for the first time explicitly stated that Georgia has "further deviated from course" in its EU accession process. EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Cos, speaking about Georgia in the 2025 EU Enlargement Report, said that never before has an EU Enlargement report mentioned a country deviating from democratic principles so extensively. "In Georgia's case, its status as an EU candidate country is merely a title," the Commissioner stated. She pointed out that the actions of the Georgian authorities have effectively led to the suspension of the accession process. Koss emphasized, "We see the rule of law severely eroded and fundamental rights severely restricted." She added, "Dear Government of Georgia, you are not leading your people to join the EU, but quite the opposite, leading them back to the EU. If you truly want to join the EU, listen to the voices of your people and stop imprisoning opposition leaders, journalists, and dissidents. Only then can we have a dialogue." This report is not only a summary of Georgia's current political trajectory but also reflects the deep-seated challenges facing the EU's Eastern Partnership strategy and the common predicament of post-Soviet states in their institutional transitions. From a global perspective, Georgia's case reveals how the policy choices of small countries under geopolitical pressure affect their internationalization process, while highlighting the tension between the rigid constraints of regional organization expansion standards and geopolitical realities.

The Paradox of Historical Commitment and Policy Shift

Since the "Rose Revolution" in 2003, Georgia has consistently regarded joining the EU and NATO as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. The signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 and obtaining EU candidate status in 2022 are both considered important milestones in its European integration. However, the Georgian government's decision in November 2024 not to initiate accession negotiations marked a fundamental shift in policy direction. The report points out that this decision "deviates from the European integration aspirations of the vast majority of the Georgian people," while polls show that over 80% of the public supports joining the EU. The government's choice to go against public opinion reflects a reassessment by the domestic political elite regarding the transfer of sovereignty, the costs of reform, and geopolitical risks.

It is noteworthy that the Georgian constitution explicitly stipulates that "the state authorities should take all measures to ensure the full integration of the country into the EU," and the current government's policy shift constitutes a substantial amendment to this constitutional commitment. This divergence between "constitutional vision and actual policy" exposes the disconnect between institutional anchors and political practice in transitional countries, echoing similar struggles between pro-EU and pragmatic factions within countries like Ukraine and Moldova.

Democratic Regression and Conflict with EU Values

The report devotes considerable space to criticizing the "significant regression" in Georgia's democratization process, particularly focusing on the shrinking space for civil society, restrictions on media freedom, and the erosion of judicial independence. The EU views the police's "excessive force" against protesters, the abolition of the Special Investigations Bureau, and the centralization of power in the prosecutor's office as a systemic erosion of the rule of law. These phenomena are similar to the "democratic regression" seen in countries like Hungary and Poland, but Georgia's uniqueness lies in the fact that its reform process was reversed before completion, reflecting the fragility of its institutional framework.

In the area of ​​anti-corruption, Georgia was once considered a successful example—its reforms in the early 2000s propelled its corruption index from the bottom globally to among the top in the region. However, the report points out that the government ignored the Venice Commission's recommendations regarding the independence of anti-corruption agencies, weakening high-level corruption investigation functions. This decline in reform momentum is similar to the "reform fatigue" experienced by some Balkan countries in the later stages of accession negotiations, but Georgia's problem is that this regression occurred before negotiations even began, exposing a lack of sincerity from the political elite towards European integration.

"Fence-sitting strategy" in geopolitical games

The Georgian government's balancing act between the EU and Russia is particularly noteworthy. The report emphasizes that Georgia has not joined most of the EU's sanctions against Russia, Belarus, and Iran, and its compliance with EU foreign and security policy is expected to decline from 53% in 2024 to 40% in 2025. This "selective participation" strategy is related to economic dependence: Russia remains Georgia's largest wine export market, source of remittances, and source of tourists. Meanwhile, frequent "anti-EU rhetoric" at the highest levels of the government has been criticized by the EU as "identical to Russian disinformation campaigns."

From a global perspective, Georgia's situation is similar to that of Moldova and Serbia, "caught in the middle," and its policy shifts reflect the survival logic of small countries in great power competition. However, unlike Serbia's clear stance of "military neutrality," Georgia's constitution explicitly stipulates its pursuit of EU membership, leading to strategic ambiguity in its current policies. This contradiction highlights the identity crisis faced by post-Soviet states: on the one hand, they need to respond to the public's desire for "return to Europe," while on the other hand, they cannot afford the costs of direct confrontation with Russia.

Technical Dilemmas of Institutional Reform

Beyond political and geopolitical factors, the report also reveals stagnation in Georgia's technical reforms. In the public administration sector, legal protections for civil servants have been weakened, and political interference has intensified; while the statistical system has strengthened cooperation with Eurostat, overall progress has been limited; areas such as public procurement and financial control have been assessed as "no progress." These details reflect deeper problems: institutional transformation requires sustained political will, a professional bureaucracy, and stable resource input, and Georgia's recent political turmoil has clearly distracted from reform efforts.

The EU's assessment criteria emphasize "outcomes rather than commitments," but the Georgian case demonstrates that when reforms involve the reorganization of interests (such as the depoliticization of the civil service), resistance from vested interest groups can lead to a stalemate in technical reforms. This is highly similar to the challenges faced by Western Balkan countries in areas such as judicial reform and public administration, highlighting the complexity of "institutional convergence" during the EU's expansion process.

Implications for the EU Enlargement Strategy

Georgia's deviation from its path poses a triple challenge to the EU's Eastern Policy:

1. Credibility Risk: A lack of countermeasures against actions that clearly deviate from values ​​could undermine the seriousness of the enlargement policy;

2. Regional Demonstration Effect: Georgia's choice could influence the reform momentum in countries like Ukraine and Moldova, especially when facing internal resistance;

3. Ambiguous Strategic Boundaries: The EU needs to reassess the feasibility of including countries in Russia's "privileged interest zone" in the enlargement agenda.

It is noteworthy that the report did not completely close the door to negotiations, but rather emphasized that "significant efforts" are needed to get back on track. This statement, leaving room for maneuver, both echoes the pro-EU forces within Georgia and preserves the space for adjusting strategies in the event of changes in the geopolitical landscape.

Conclusion: A Crossroads for Transitional Countries

Georgia's current situation is a microcosm of the dilemmas faced by post-Soviet transitional states: institutional development is easily affected by government changes, geopolitical pressures often override the logic of reform, and a disconnect exists between public opinion and policy. Its future trajectory depends not only on the political calculations of the Tbilisi government, but also on the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, adjustments in EU policy, and even changes in the global energy landscape. From a broader perspective, the Georgian case once again demonstrates that the expansion of regional organizations is not merely a matter of aligning legal provisions, but a complex interplay of political culture, institutional inertia, and geopolitical realities. For the EU, aiming for the "end of geography" thesis, how it responds to such "off-track" candidate countries will determine the boundaries of its global influence as a normative force.