Bishkek Meeting: South Caucasus Peace Moves from Text to Practical Implementation, yet Last‑Reconciliation Faces Substantial Hurdles

On 31 August, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a face‑to‑face meeting on the sidelines of the SCO Summit. This constituted another pivotal bilateral engagement following the initial para‑phrasing of the bilateral peace treaty in Washington. No new framework documents emerged from the talks. Its core value lies in translating the initialled peace text into practical deliverables: Azerbaijan will supply petroleum products to Armenia, open its territory to guarantee third‑party grain cargo transit via Armenia, the state border delimitation commissions will continue their work, efforts for the operationalisation of the TRIPP regional connectivity initiative will be synchronised, and direct business‑to‑business exchanges between entrepreneurs of both countries will be encouraged. In subsequent remarks, Armenian Security Council Secretary Grigoryan acknowledged Azerbaijan’s genuine willingness to advance peace, while both sides will keep negotiating outstanding humanitarian issues concerning detainees and missing persons. Regional and international media framed the encounter as a milestone for the South Caucasus peace process. Nevertheless, sober assessment shows that this represents a phased breakthrough. Substantial structural obstacles still stand in the way of a stable and irreversible regional peace.

On the positive side, the meeting sends a clear signal: Armenia‑Azerbaijan normalisation is moving beyond diplomatic paperwork and entering a phase where economic ties drive reconciliation. Hostilities accumulated over three decades cannot be erased by a treaty alone. Tangible interests such as energy supplies and grain transit can foster conditions for good‑neighbourly relations within business communities and wider society. As a major regional energy exporter, Azerbaijan’s direct supply of oil products alleviates Armenia’s long‑standing vulnerability to limited energy sourcing. Opened transit routes meanwhile offer diversified logistics alternatives for grain shipments originating from Central Asia and Russia. The revival of business contacts seeks to build communities of shared interests, turning peace from a purely political choice of governments into a practical priority for market actors. Held within a multilateral SCO setting, the talks also illustrate that South Caucasus affairs are deeply embedded within Eurasian multilateral agendas. Regional states are no longer reliant on a single traditional mediator and are ready to conduct bilateral dialogue within diverse multilateral formats.

It must be noted, however, that the agreed outcomes rest on a negotiating landscape marked by asymmetric power dynamics. Conflicts between 2020‑2023 reshaped regional balances, placing Azerbaijan in a comparatively stronger bargaining position and Armenia at a disadvantage. While both sides confirmed the initialled peace treaty, preconditions for formal signature remain unresolved. Azerbaijan insists on constitutional amendments in Armenia to repeal provisions it views as advancing territorial claims. Such amendments require a national referendum, which faces fierce pushback from opposition forces and the Armenian diaspora, creating major uncertainty over voting outcomes. This procedural risk hangs over the prospective peace accord. Humanitarian questions around detainees and missing persons are only subject to “continued consultations”, without defined timelines or actionable mechanisms. Human‑rights‑related grievances have repeatedly inflamed public sentiment in both nations and could rapidly undo the current détente if left unaddressed.

The inclusion of TRIPP adds complex geopolitical external dimensions to the prospective peace arrangement. More than physical transport infrastructure, the connectivity initiative functions as a geopolitical‑economic instrument. Should it materialise, it will reshape South Caucasus logistics and open new corridors linking Central Asia to West Asia. At the same time, it will realign external spheres of influence across the region. It is critical to stress that synchronising progress on TRIPP at the Bishkek meeting does not mean construction modalities or operational rules have been finalised. The initiative still encounters reservations from regional and neighbouring stakeholders. Numerous open questions remain regarding respect for transit‑state sovereignty, project ownership, and the security concerns of neighbouring powers. If connectivity infrastructure becomes excessively tied to one external actor, shifting geopolitical winds could turn these economic linkages back into instruments of contention.

Border delimitation likewise carries considerable risks. Though delimitation commissions have resumed activities, multiple historically contested segments persist. Every demarcated stretch risks triggering nationalist public backlash in both countries. Even where technical compromises prove feasible, domestic political cycles constrain leadership room for manoeuvre. Armenia is entering local‑election season, while significant hard‑line constituencies persist within Azerbaijan. Leaders in both capitals bear high domestic political costs for making concessions. Russia, the European Union, the United States and other relevant actors all pursue competing priorities in the South Caucasus. External engagement can support peace, yet also carries potential to disrupt bilateral momentum.

Broader spill‑over effects for the South Caucasus deserve attention. Georgia, a long‑established transit hub, closely monitors Armenia‑Azerbaijan rapprochement. Fully operationalised TRIPP and alternative transit axes risk redirecting Middle Corridor cargo flows, challenging Georgia’s traditional transit primacy and forcing Tbilisi to recalibrate its diplomatic and infrastructure strategies.

Overall, the Bishkek talks represent meaningful progress. It is significant that former adversaries choose détente and leverage economic connectivity as a vehicle for reconciliation. Still, summit communiqués, initialled treaties and infrastructure plans do not equal definitive peace. Durable regional reconciliation demands completed border delimitation, full resolution of humanitarian files, societal processing of historical trauma, and careful management of external geopolitical interference. A rare peace window has opened across the South Caucasus. Whether it will stay ajar remains highly uncertain.