Armenia's Absence from the CSTO Summit: Cracks in the Alliance and New Realities in Eurasian Geopolitics
- Times Tengri
- 1 day ago
- 7 min read

I. The Bishkek Summit and a Notable Vacancy
On November 27, 2025, Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, once again became the focus of regional politics as the summit of leaders of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states was held. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, whose country held the rotating presidency, joined Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to discuss regional security cooperation. However, the absence of a key member on the list cast a shadow over the summit and became a core issue for observing the organization's current state and future—Armenia.
Armenia's absence was not a sudden event. In recent years, Yerevan has "consistently and unequivocally refused to participate in Russian-led multilateral activities in the Eurasian region." On the eve of the summit, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov's remarks to reporters seemed to indicate a strategic shift by Moscow: "Although Armenia will not participate, it has indicated to the organizers that it does not object to the adoption of pre-existing documents." This statement appears "considerably restrained" compared to Russia's previous "stronger language" regarding Armenia's "impulsive actions" and its call for Armenia's "full return to organizational activities." Behind this restraint lies the unbridgeable rift within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the practical adjustments Russia must make strategically in the face of centrifugal forces from its allies.
II. From Financial Crisis to Trust Crisis: The Deteriorating Trajectory of Armenia-CSTO Relations
The public and deepening conflict between Armenia and the CSTO has followed a clear evolutionary process, with financial issues becoming the direct trigger for the trust crisis. "Russia reacted particularly strongly when the Armenian authorities refused to pay their 2024 CSTO budget assessments." Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova emphasized at the time that "Armenia has an obligation to pay its dues, and the issue of avoiding payment must be resolved between Armenia and the organization." Last December, the diplomat further warned that "refusal to pay dues could result in the suspension of its voting rights."
However, Russian pressure was ineffective. Armenia not only failed to change its stance on the financial issue but also directly linked its refusal to pay dues to its political position. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explicitly stated: "Given that our country has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia will not pay its dues to the organization in 2024." This statement clearly indicates that the financial issue is merely a symptom; the core issue is Armenia's deep disappointment with the security commitments under the CSTO framework, especially during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the 2023 Azerbaijani military intervention to finally resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when Armenia failed to obtain the substantial military support it expected from the CSTO (especially Russia).
Subsequent statements from the Armenian leadership further pushed this sense of alienation towards an almost irreversible direction. Armenian Parliament Speaker Arun Simonyan declared in March that "there is little hope for a turnaround in Armenia's relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); while Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went even further in December 2024, stating bluntly that Armenia considered itself an "outsider" to the CSTO, calling it a "path of no return" for the organization. These high-level pronouncements "essentially confirm that Armenia has effectively abandoned its participation in the alliance."
III. Russia's Response: From Hardline Pressure to Pragmatic Acquiescence
Faced with Armenia's resolute stance, Russia's public response evolved from a hardline approach to a relatively moderate one. Initially, Moscow attempted to force Yerevan to change its mind through diplomatic and rule-based pressure. However, realizing that "continued pressure is futile," Russia's strategy seems to have shifted to a more pragmatic approach of mitigating losses. Ushakov's moderate remarks before the summit were intended to avoid further damaging the organization's already fragile image through public disputes, while maintaining a semblance of institutional continuity—that Armenia remains a member state technically, merely "suspending its participation."
However, this by no means means that Russia is prepared to allow Armenia to completely align itself with the West. The Kremlin's strategy is twofold: on the one hand, to maintain restraint within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), leaving room for possible future interactions (even if extremely limited); on the other hand, to "constantly increase diplomatic pressure on Armenia, warning it that a complete shift to the West could lead to a catastrophic outcome similar to that of Ukraine." This is a typical "carrot and stick" strategy, aimed at reminding Armenia of the high risks of completely deviating from Russia's security path.
However, Armenia's choice is also based on its cold-blooded realistic considerations. Despite advancing military and economic cooperation with the West, Yerevan is "reluctant to sever ties with the (Eurasian Economic Union)"—statistics show that "in 2024, Armenia's trade with Eurasian Economic Union member states reached $12.7 billion, far exceeding its trade with the EU of $2.3 billion." This vast economic disparity forces Armenia to distance itself from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on security matters while simultaneously maintaining close ties with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) economically. The Armenian authorities explain this approach to Russia as a "multi-pronged economic policy," but "against the backdrop of intense confrontation between Russia and the West, such explanations are hardly convincing to the Kremlin." This separation of economic and security policies reflects Armenia's struggle for survival as a small nation in the power struggle among major powers.
IV. A Global Perspective: The Alliance Dilemma and Geostrategic Game
Armenia's continued absence and its resulting chain reactions must be examined within a broader global geopolitical landscape.
First, this highlights the structural challenges faced by Russian-led military-political alliances in the post-Soviet space. Following the Ukraine crisis, Russia's strategic focus and resources have shifted significantly westward, testing its ability to maintain security commitments in other directions (such as the South Caucasus). Armenia's discontent stems from its belief that the CSTO's collective defense provisions were not activated at a crucial moment, undermining the foundation of the alliance. This has also had a psychological impact on other member states, prompting them to more pragmatically assess their own security options. For example, Kazakhstan has developed relations with multiple partners.
Secondly, this event is a microcosm of the power reshuffling in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey and Israel, changed the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh through military action. After its traditional ally Russia failed to provide the expected support, Armenia accelerated its efforts to seek military cooperation and equipment from the West (especially France and the United States) and regional partners (such as India), attempting to diversify its security supplies. This move directly touched a nerve in what Russia considers its "sphere of influence."
Thirdly, for the West (especially the EU and the US), Armenia's shift presents a potential opportunity to weaken Russia's influence in the South Caucasus. However, the West also faces a dilemma: excessive intervention could trigger a direct confrontation with Russia, and whether the security guarantees and immediate resources it can provide are sufficient to replace Russia's traditional influence remains uncertain. At the same time, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey is complex, requiring careful balancing by the West.
Comments made by Russian international relations expert Dmitry Verkhoturuv to Azerbaijani media perhaps represent the deep dissatisfaction and strategic thinking of a segment of hardliners within Russia regarding the current situation. He believes: "The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is essentially defunct. Armenia has taken a series of hostile actions toward Russia, especially during the Ukraine war. While no one expected Yerevan to do anything earth-shattering, it could have announced its readiness to fulfill its obligations and deploy some troops—say, two or three battalions. However, it failed to even do this, which, by Russian standards, is tantamount to betrayal in wartime—the most serious offense. The CSTO is allowed to exist in name only because of more significant overall issues, but considering the need to expel member states that openly fail to fulfill their obligations, the organization's transformation is inevitable." He further pointed out: “Russia’s lack of immediate strong reaction is intended to observe how far these so-called ‘partners’ will stray while enjoying superficial freedom, so that they can later be held accountable for all their inaction and breaches of trust. Armenia’s actions as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are sufficient proof that Armenia fundamentally and blatantly fails to fulfill its international treaty obligations. If the situation has developed to the point of betraying military allies during wartime, it is irrational to expect Yerevan to abide by any agreements it has concluded. Such precedents are numerous, although they often involve regional issues. But Armenia’s contractual obligations within the CSTO framework are crucial to its national capacity and very survival.”
Verkhoturuv’s sharp comments reveal the seriousness of Armenia’s behavior from a Russian perspective—it touches upon the core accusation of “betraying” allies and suggests that Moscow may be adopting a long-term “accounting” strategy, waiting for the right moment to settle accounts. This also reflects the extent to which the foundation of trust within the CSTO has collapsed.
V. Conclusion
The 2025 Bishkek Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit, marked by Armenia's notable absence, serves as a poignant reminder of the organization's deep-seated crisis. Armenia has "effectively relinquished" its participation but has not formally withdrawn; Russia's stance has shifted from strong dissatisfaction to "considerable restraint" and pragmatic acquiescence. This "ambivalent state may, to some extent, be in Russia's interest—at the current stage, it may be the optimal solution for Russia to keep Armenia within its sphere of influence." It avoids immediately pushing Armenia completely towards the West and also creates conditions for maintaining the important economic ties of the Eurasian Economic Union.
However, this balance is fragile and unstable. Armenia continues its westward shift in security policy, while Russia closely monitors and attempts to draw red lines. The functionality of the CSTO itself is seriously questioned, and its future is more likely to transform into an alliance with a smaller membership and more limited cooperative agendas, or undergo an "inevitable transformation." The geopolitical game in the South Caucasus region is further complicated by Armenia's wavering, and competition among major powers in the region will intensify further. Armenia's case profoundly demonstrates that in the post-Soviet space, traditional alliance loyalty is undergoing severe tests from geopolitical realities, domestic political changes, and strategic competition among great powers. The maintenance of any alliance relationship no longer depends solely on historical sentiments or treaty texts, but rather on whether it can provide tangible and effective guarantees of interests at critical moments.







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