The Istanbul Talks: Can the 3+3 Platform Redraw South Caucasus Geopolitics?

The third ministerial meeting of the 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform for the South Caucasus concluded in Istanbul this week, bringing together foreign ministers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran and host Turkey. Georgia, a founding participant of the framework, remained absent, continuing its long-standing refusal to engage with the mechanism. The gathering ended with the adoption of a joint declaration, before all foreign ministers received a meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

On paper, the document sets out a pragmatic agenda. Parties affirmed their commitment to lasting regional peace, underlining that all outstanding disputes ought to be settled through dialogue rather than confrontation. Delegates agreed to advance cross-border connectivity projects spanning transport corridors, energy infrastructure, trade links and digital communications, arguing that deepening economic interdependence would gradually build mutual trust across a region scarred by decades of friction.

Optimism surrounding the platform ought to be tempered, however, by sharply diverging strategic priorities among its participants. Russia regards the South Caucasus as its traditional sphere of influence and views the format as a channel to sustain its regional standing. Turkey seeks to strengthen its footprint across the Caucasus by leveraging ethnic, cultural and transit ties. Iran prioritises safeguarding its northern borders and securing alternative east-west trade routes. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the negotiations offer a venue to manage their bilateral tensions, yet fundamental disagreements over border delimitation remain unresolved.

The absence of Georgia represents the format’s most obvious structural weakness. Tbilisi’s pro-Western diplomatic orientation leaves it deeply sceptical of a mechanism that brings Moscow, Ankara and Tehran together without Western involvement. Without the full participation of all three South Caucasus states, the 3+3 framework can hardly claim to represent a complete regional settlement mechanism.

It remains an open question whether fine declarations will translate into tangible action. Transport and energy cooperation brings shared commercial incentives, making such projects the most likely area for progress. Political reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan poses a far steeper hurdle.

What unfolds in Istanbul signals a simple truth: the South Caucasus has become an arena of multipolar competition. The 3+3 platform offers a channel for regional powers to manage tensions without outside mediation. Still, it is unlikely to erase competing geopolitical ambitions. This diplomatic initiative may create space for incremental de-escalation, yet lasting stability across the South Caucasus will hinge on whether participants can subordinate competing strategic aims to shared regional interests.