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The 19th Round of EU Sanctions and Central Asian Countries: Geoeconomic Challenges and Adaptation in a Global Perspective

  • Writer: Times Tengri
    Times Tengri
  • Oct 24
  • 6 min read

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The EU's recently adopted and announced 19th round of sanctions against Russia marks a further escalation of Western economic pressure on Russia and a strategic shift. A notable feature of this round of sanctions is their expanded scope: they target not only Russian companies and financial institutions, but also businesses from Central Asia (such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan), China, India, and Thailand. Several Central Asian banks—including Tolubai Bank and Eurasian Savings Bank in Kyrgyzstan, and Dushanbe City Bank, Spitamen Bank, and Tajik Commercial Bank in Tajikistan—are accused of facilitating circumvention of previous restrictions and face the risk of a complete disruption of financial transactions with European counterparties and loss of access to international payment systems. The relevant measures will take effect on November 12. This development has far-reaching implications for Central Asian countries and warrants global scrutiny, encompassing multiple dimensions, including economic resilience, geostrategic positioning, regional integration, and participation in the global financial system.

 

I. Direct Economic Impact: Financial Isolation and Liquidity Crisis

 

The sanctions' direct impact on Central Asian countries will be felt primarily in the financial sector. Designated banks will immediately lose access to all financial transactions with EU entities, including correspondent banking, letter of credit issuance, and cross-border payment settlements. More seriously, being cut off from international payment systems like SWIFT (or facing equivalent restrictions) will effectively isolate these banks from the international financial system.

 

1. Hindered Remittance Income: Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are significant recipients of remittances, their economies heavily dependent on remittances from expatriates working in Russia. These remittances traditionally flow back through financial channels, including affected banks. Sanctions could disrupt remittance routes, increase costs, or divert them to informal channels, directly impacting the livelihoods of millions of families and the stability of national foreign exchange reserves.

2. Drying Out of Trade Finance: Central Asian countries rely on bank financing for their trade with the EU and global markets. Sanctioned banks' inability to process euro settlements will force local importers and exporters to seek alternative banks or payment methods, potentially leading to trade delays, increased costs, and the risk of contract defaults, impacting already fragile economic chains.

3. Damaged Foreign Confidence: International investors will reassess their risk exposure in Central Asia. Sanctions against financial institutions are seen as a manifestation of systemic risk and could trigger capital outflows, suspensions or withdrawals of foreign investment projects, and challenge the region's efforts to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).

 

II. Geostrategic Dilemma: Striving for a Balance between Russia and Europe

 

Central Asian countries have historically sat at the intersection of Russia's traditional sphere of influence, Europe, and the broader Western world. The EU's sanctions, in essence, more explicitly apply the logic of "secondary sanctions" or "long-arm jurisdiction," derived from the context of Sino-US strategic competition, to Central Asia, forcing countries to make difficult choices amidst the delicate geopolitical balance.

 

1. Pressure on Relations with Russia: Central Asian countries have close ties with Russia in energy, security, and the labor market. The sanctions are intended to block circumvention channels, meaning that normal trade and economic activities between Central Asian companies (not just banks) and Russia could be deemed "violations" by the EU, putting them at risk of being added to subsequent sanctions lists. This forces Central Asian governments to carefully balance maintaining economic cooperation with Russia (which affects energy supply, market access, and security dependence) with avoiding the wrath of the EU (which affects technology access, development aid, and long-term strategic cooperation).

2. Highlighting the "Global South" Position: The sanctions place Central Asia alongside emerging economies such as China, India, and Thailand, reflecting the EU's efforts to extend regulations beyond its traditional sphere of influence in response to shifting global geoeconomic dynamics. The response strategies of Central Asian countries will impact their positioning and voice within the emerging "Global South." Whether they choose coordinated action to secure policy space or pursue individual breakthroughs independently will test the wisdom of regional diplomacy.

 

III. Regional Economic Integration and Internal Coordination Challenges

 

The sanctions are likely to have complex impacts on the regional economic integration process that Central Asian countries have been diligently promoting in recent years.

 

1. Increased need for internal coordination: Faced with shared external pressure, the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) may need to strengthen internal coordination, jointly assess risks, and discuss response strategies. For example, this could involve promoting local currency settlement within the region, jointly building alternative payment systems, or unifying negotiating positions on economic and trade rules with major partners. This crisis could potentially transform into an opportunity for deepening regional cooperation.

2. Coexisting risks of divergence: Differences among countries in their economic dependence on Russia, the number and significance of sanctioned entities, and their own economic structures could lead to varying response strategies and the extent of the impact. For example, Kazakhstan, with its larger economy, abundant energy resources, and diverse ties with Europe, may be more resilient than Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which rely heavily on remittances. Such differences could weaken the region's capacity for collective action and even trigger internal conflict.

 

IV. Exploring alternative paths for the global financial and payment systems

 

One of the core tools of EU sanctions is financial isolation, which will inevitably accelerate global discussions and implementation of alternatives to the existing dollar- and euro-dominated financial infrastructure.

 

1. Local Currency Settlement and Bilateral Currency Arrangements: Central Asian countries are increasingly pressing to expand local currency settlement with major trading partners (such as Russia, China, and Turkey). This will help mitigate the risks of the US dollar/euro system, but practical obstacles such as currency conversion difficulties, high exchange rate volatility, and insufficient liquidity must be overcome.

2. Alternative Payment System Applications: Sanctioned banks and related companies may seek access to Russia's SPFS (Symbol of the Financial Information Transfer System) and China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), or explore cross-border payment solutions based on digital currencies. While these measures can maintain basic international trade and economic exchanges, they may deepen dependence on the technology of specific countries and pose limitations in terms of liquidity, convenience, and global acceptance.

3. Risks of Informal Financial Activities: If formal channels continue to shrink, some economic activities may be forced underground, conducted through informal or crypto-asset channels, increasing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, worsening the business environment, and potentially attracting greater scrutiny from organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

 

V. Long-Term Structural Impacts and Adaptation Paths

 

In the long run, these sanctions may serve as a catalyst for economic restructuring and governance reform in Central Asian countries, but they may also exacerbate their economic development difficulties.

 

1. Urgent Economic Diversification: The risks of over-reliance on a single economy (whether Russia or the EU) are becoming increasingly apparent. This pressure may compel countries to accelerate their economic diversification strategies, develop non-resource-based industries such as manufacturing, services, and the digital economy, and reduce their reliance on remittances, energy exports, or specific external markets.

2. Aligning Governance Standards with International Standards: To avoid future disputes, Central Asian countries may need to strengthen their financial regulatory, anti-corruption, and compliance systems, ensure that businesses comply with international sanctions, and enhance transparency and predictability in economic governance to maintain trust and access to international markets.

3. Social Stability Faces a Test: Indirect impacts such as economic downturn, declining remittances, and rising prices may translate into social pressures, particularly in countries with weak economic foundations and low social tolerance. Governments must carefully address potential livelihood difficulties and social discontent to maintain internal stability.

 

Conclusion

 

The 19th round of EU sanctions has placed Central Asian countries at the forefront of global geopolitical competition. In the short term, affected countries, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will face significant financial volatility, slowing economic growth, and geostrategic dilemmas. In the medium and long term, this incident highlights Central Asia's structural vulnerabilities within the global economic system and the extreme difficulty of maintaining balance amidst great power competition. The solution lies in strengthening internal economic resilience, promoting regional cooperation, exploring payment diversification, and prudently navigating a complex international environment to maximize their development interests and strategic autonomy. This process not only affects Central Asia's own stability and development but also provides an important case study for observing the adaptation and choices made by countries in the "Global South" as a new international order emerges.

 
 
 

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