Azerbaijan Deepens Strategic Partnership with Israel

The meeting between Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhon Bayramov and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar on January 26, 2026, is the latest testament to the strategic partnership between the two countries. This meeting covered diverse areas including energy, security, and tourism, reflecting the shared need for strengthened cooperation amidst regional changes. From a global perspective, the deepening of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations is not only a bilateral matter but also closely intertwined with geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and even among major powers.

I. Foundation of Strategic Cooperation: Energy Interlocking and Security Synergy

Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel began in the 1990s but has accelerated significantly in recent years. Energy is the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship: Azerbaijan is a major oil supplier to Israel, accounting for 40% of its oil imports; while Israel provides Azerbaijan with advanced military equipment, with 70% of the latter's arsenal originating from Israel between 2016 and 2020. During the talks, both sides emphasized the groundbreaking significance of SOCAR's acquisition of a 10% stake in Israeli gas fields, marking an upgrade in cooperation from trade to capital integration.

This mutually beneficial relationship stems from shared geopolitical needs. After resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan seeks "strategic autonomy," attempting to break free from its traditional reliance on Russian influence; Israel, on the other hand, pursues a "marginalism" diplomacy, using its alliances with Iran's neighbors (such as Azerbaijan and Turkey) to counterbalance Iran. Notably, both countries view Iran as a security threat, thus coordinating closely on intelligence sharing and defense system development. For example, when Israel launched its attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, although Azerbaijan denied providing airspace support, Iran still accused Israeli warplanes of launching the attack from Azerbaijani airspace, highlighting the sensitivity of their security cooperation.

II. Economic Diversification: A Partnership Beyond Energy

In addition to energy and security, both sides are accelerating the expansion of their cooperation areas. Tourism and trade are emerging as new growth drivers: In the first 11 months of 2025, the number of Israeli tourists visiting Azerbaijan doubled, with 20 regular flights per week, and a total of approximately 60,000 Israeli tourists are expected to visit by 2025. Furthermore, 124 Israeli companies are active in Azerbaijan in high-tech, agriculture, and pharmaceutical sectors, and the joint government committee plans to further expand investment through business forums.

Azerbaijan's economic development strategy draws on the Gulf states' model, attempting to modernize its economy through energy revenue. For example, Masdar of the UAE is building Azerbaijan's largest solar power plant, Saudi Arabia's ACWA Power is investing in wind power projects, while Israel provides technological support in areas such as drip irrigation agriculture and the digital economy. This diversified cooperation helps Azerbaijan reduce its dependence on traditional energy exports while providing Israel with a bridge to the Central Asian market.

III. Regional Role: Azerbaijan's "Mediation Diplomacy"

Leveraging its good relations with Israel, Turkey, and Arab countries, Azerbaijan actively plays the role of a regional mediator. In April 2025, Azerbaijan hosted technical talks between Turkey and Israel in Baku, aiming to ease tensions and establish a "no-conflict mechanism." Despite Turkey's criticism of Israel over the Gaza issue, Azerbaijan facilitated the dialogue as a "mutual friend," demonstrating its diplomatic skill.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan supplied Syria with 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas and promoted indirect contact between Syria and Israel. This move alleviated Syria's energy crisis and enhanced Azerbaijan's influence in the Arab world. Some analysts suggest that the new Syrian government may consider joining the Abraham Accords, which, if realized, would reshape the Middle East landscape, and Azerbaijan's mediating role cannot be ignored.

IV. Challenges and Risks: Balancing Great Power Interests

The deepening of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations is not without obstacles. Turkey and Iran are wary of Azerbaijan's inclinations: Turkey demands that Azerbaijan downplay Israel's influence in energy cooperation, while Iran worries that separatist sentiment among its Azerbaijani population could be exploited by Israel. Following the June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, Azerbaijan was forced to publicly call for de-escalation, reflecting its dilemma in the great power game.

On the other hand, the influence of the United States is ubiquitous. Azerbaijan's "Baku-Jerusalem-Washington trilateral security cooperation" aims to integrate into the US-led Middle East security system, but this vision may exacerbate friction with Russia. Although relations between Azerbaijan and Russia deteriorated due to the 2024 plane crash, completely aligning with the West is not the optimal solution; a delicate balance must be maintained among the US, Russia, Turkey, and Iran in the future.

Conclusion: Variables and Constants of Regional Stability

The relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel has transcended the bilateral scope, becoming an important window into the geopolitical evolution of the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Based on energy cooperation, the two countries have gradually expanded to multi-layered interactions in economics, security, and diplomacy, enhancing their respective strategic autonomy and providing new pathways for regional conflict resolution. However, great power competition and regional contradictions remain potential challenges, and the resilience of the Azerbaijani partnership will depend on its ability to find a sustainable balance between interests and risks.