Armenia Parts Way with the CSTO, Shifting Geostrategically Westward

Behind Yerevan's decision lies the CSTO's disappointing performance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the difficult choices a small nation faces in seeking survival amidst the power dynamics of major powers.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's remarks during a parliamentary inquiry on October 1st marked the official rupture of Armenia's relationship with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Pashinyan bluntly stated, "The failure of CSTO member states to fulfill their obligations to Armenia compels our country to maintain an independent position within the organization."

This statement was a direct repudiation of the organization and reflected Armenia's deep disappointment with Russia's security commitments.

01 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: The Fuse of the CSTO's Failure

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts of 2020 and 2023 marked a turning point in Armenia's relationship with the CSTO. Pashinyan noted that when Armenia realizes in 2022 that "the CSTO has not, does not, and will not fulfill its obligations to its member states, then we will truly achieve independence, because we understand that we can only rely on ourselves."

Armenia has repeatedly stressed that the CSTO failed to fulfill its obligations to Armenia during the deteriorating situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in 2021-2022. This feeling of being abandoned by its allies resonated strongly within Armenia.

During his visit to Yerevan in May of this year, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov specifically emphasized that Armenia has never officially recognized the status of the "former Nagorno-Karabakh Republic." This statement was interpreted as Russia maintaining a neutral stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, even leaning towards Azerbaijan, which left Armenia feeling betrayed.

Pashinyan likened the CSTO security system to a "bubble," bluntly stating that it is essentially "a tool to hinder our country's development." This sharp criticism reflects the Armenian leadership's utter disillusionment with the organization.

02 Armenia's Strategic Shift: From Russia to the West

In response to the CSTO's failure, Armenia began actively diversifying its foreign policy. In February 2024, Pashinyan announced a freeze on Armenia's participation in the CSTO. In May of the same year, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced a halt to financial support for the organization.

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan held talks with NATO Deputy Secretary-General Radmila Shekelinska during the Warsaw Security Forum, where they discussed the possibility of expanding cooperation between Armenia and NATO.

The Individual Partnership Cooperation Program, signed between Armenia and NATO in December 2005, remains in effect. This program includes regular regional security consultations, the development of a national security strategy, and the revision of military doctrine.

Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan explicitly stated that "the Armenian Ministry of Defense continues to receive professional advisory support from France and the United States, and Greece is also providing coordinated assistance in various areas." This statement clearly demonstrates the shift in the direction of Armenia's security cooperation.

03 Russia's Response and Regional Geopolitical Changes

Faced with Armenia's shift, Russia has expressed caution. Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia had not received any official statement from Armenia regarding the suspension of its CSTO membership, adding that it was crucial to understand the details.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev warned Armenia, "Don't expect the EU to accept you." He called Western promises to Armenia, including EU membership, "neo-colonial bait."

Russia's military presence in Armenia has become a point of contention between the two sides. Russia maintains two military bases in Armenia: the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri and the 3624th Air Force Base in the capital, Yerevan.

In addition, Russia maintains four border guard units in Armenia. Armenia has demanded that Russian border guards cease operations at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan.

Armenia's geostrategic shift is also reflected in the economic and trade sphere. According to data from the Armenian State Statistics Committee, trade between Armenia and Russia increased by 43% in 2023, totaling over $7 billion.

Russia remains Armenia's largest foreign trade partner. This economic connection will make it difficult for Armenia to completely break away from Russia.

04 Armenia's Strategic Adjustment in a Global Perspective

Armenia's strategic adjustment occurs within the broader context of global geopolitical changes. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues, Russia's influence in its traditional sphere of influence is challenged, providing strategic options for countries like Armenia.

Politico reported that Pashinyan has been seeking to establish closer ties with the United States and the European Union. In September 2023, the United States and Armenia co-hosted the "Eagle Partner 2023" joint military exercise.

The European Union is also actively involved in South Caucasus affairs. In September 2023, the EU demanded that Azerbaijan cease all military activities and threatened to take severe countermeasures if Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region were forced to flee.

France is the most involved EU country. In October 2023, France announced its agreement to provide military equipment to Armenia. In February of this year, the defense ministers of France and Armenia formally signed a military sales contract.

Armenia has also strengthened military cooperation with India. In 2022, the two countries reached a military sales contract worth approximately $250 million. This diversified military cooperation helps Armenia reduce its dependence on a single country.

05 Challenges and Prospects: Limitations and Possibilities of Armenia's Strategic Autonomy

Armenia's westward-oriented strategy faces numerous challenges. Medvedev warned that Western promises to Armenia, including EU membership, are merely "bait in a neo-colonial trap."

Citing Ukraine, he said, "Just ask Ukrainian nationalists whether they have achieved EU membership. No, they will not in the short term. Will they wait forever?"

There are also concerns within Armenia. Armenia's Security Council Secretary, Grigoriyan, acknowledged that Armenia's economy is closely tied to Russia. A hasty EU accession could lead to the closure of the Lars checkpoint, the only land route between Armenia and Russia, to Armenian freight companies, posing serious economic and security risks.

At the same time, a complete severance of Armenia from Russia is unrealistic. In terms of people-to-people exchanges, Armenians have a large presence in Russia, contributing significantly to remittances.

According to statistics from the Central Bank of Armenia, from January to June 2023, remittances from Russia accounted for 72.8% of Armenia's remittances. These deep cultural and economic ties will not be quickly severed by political decisions.

Pogosyan, a senior researcher at the Armenian Institute for Applied Policy Studies, analyzed that "regardless of global developments, Russia will remain a key player in the South Caucasus region for years to come, and a deterioration in Russia-Armenia relations will only exacerbate the challenges facing Armenia."

For Armenia, the ideal path may be to maintain necessary cooperation with Russia while gradually diversifying its security architecture. Pashinyan's statement reflects the difficult choices faced by small countries seeking strategic autonomy amidst the competition among major powers.

The future geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus will depend on the complex interaction between Russia, Türkiye, Iran and Western forces.